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ABSTRACT: 
Although theories from economics and evolutionary biology predict that one’s age, 
health, and survival probability should be associated with one’s subjective discount 
rate (SDR), few studies have empirically tested for these links. Our study analyzes in 
detail how the SDR is related to age, health, and survival probability, by surveying a 
sample of individuals in townships around Durban, South Africa. In contrast to 
previous studies, we find that age is not significantly related to the SDR, but both 
physical health and survival expectations have a U-shaped relationship with the SDR. 
Individuals in very poor health have high discount rates, and those in very good health 
also have high discount rates. Similarly, those with expected survival probability on 
the extremes have high discount rates. Therefore, health and survival probability, and 
not age, seem to be predictors of one’s SDR in an area of the world with high 
morbidity and mortality. 
 
JEL Classification: I10, D90 
KEY WORDS: subjective discount rate; delay discounting; expected survival 
probability; health; age; South Africa 
  2INTRODUCTION 
People generally prefer to receive a reward sooner rather than later. The present value 
of a future reward is often discounted when there is a delay to receiving the reward. 
Many terms are used to describe this phenomenon, such as time preference, positive 
rate of intertemporal substitution, impatience, and impulsivity. ‘Delay discounting’ 
will be used in this paper to refer to the phenomenon that an individual discounts the 
value of a reward to be received in the future relative to receiving the reward 
immediately, and the degree to which an individual discounts the future reward will 
be measured as the subjective discount rate or SDR (which we define formally 
below). Although delay discounting is a common assumption in models of 
intertemporal choice, most models implicitly assume that each person’s SDR is an 
exogenous, immutable, and innate trait.
1 The literature is relatively incomplete when 
it comes to why people discount the future in general and why some people discount 
more than others. Only a few studies explore deeper into the factors that might affect 
an individual’s SDR. If changes in these factors do systematically alter intertemporal 
choice, then there is an important role for researchers to determine what these factors 
are and perhaps how the factors can be changed to improve individual utility. For 
instance, innumerous (bad) outcomes which are related to impatience could in theory 
be prevented, if the willingness to wait for some future reward could be enhanced.  
  Among the various determinants of delay discounting proposed in the 
literature (which we review in detail in the next section on Theory and Background), 
age has emerged as a key determinant. Although existing theoretical models of delay 
discounting often explicitly specify mortality risk (which reduces opportunity for 
                                                 
1 A recent study has identified a genotype for immediate reward bias (Boettiger et al., 
2007). 
  3consumption in the future) and morbidity risk (which reduces utility from 
consumption in the future) as determinants of delay discounting, most existing 
empirical tests of the theoretical models rely mostly on age as a proxy for those risks. 
Our study complements the existing literature by going one layer beyond age as the 
determinant of delay discounting. Because mortality and morbidity risks may be the 
true underlying determinants of delay discounting, we added health and survival 
probability – in addition to age – in our empirical specifications. In environments 
such as southern Africa with high prevalence of acute illnesses (including 
HIV/AIDS), age is no longer a good proxy for mortality and morbidity risks; here, 
health and survival probability may play more important roles than age in determining 
people’s SDRs.  
Theory and Background 
Below we describe research that tries to explain why people discount the future. We 
begin by more precisely stating the individual’s decision problem. Using discounted 
utility theory (see reviews by Frederick et. al., 2002 and Read, 2003), we can 
represent the individual’s intertemporal utility function as follows: 
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where   is the utility derived from consumptions,  t U ( ) 1 , ,..., ,... tt t n T cc c c ++ , that 
regularly occur from time period t up to the final time period T of the individual’s life; 
 is the individual’s instantaneous utility from consumption c in time period 
t+d; t is the time period when evaluation of this utility occurs; d is the amount of 
delay since time period t, and F(d) is a discount function. Because the present value of 
future consumption is often discounted when there is a delay, F(d)  is usually 
represented by some declining function with respect to delay, with F(0)=1 when there 
( td uc + )
  4is no delay. Corresponding to each discount function is a discount rate or r(d), which 
is defined as the proportional change in value of F(d) per period of time interval (such 
as a day or a year): 











In this paper, we call the individual’s discount rate the subjective discount rate or 
SDR.  
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where  ρ  is a discount parameter per period of time interval (such as per day or per 
year), and d is the number of time intervals in the delay (measured in number of days 
or number of years). Greaterρ means greater per-period discounting; also, the longer 
the delay, the greater the total discounting applied to the delayed consumption. Based 








which is independent of the amount of delay.
2  
  Although the exponential discount functional form has been used traditionally 
in studies of delay discounting, a hyperbolic discount function has also gained 
acceptance and has been found in some studies to fit empirical data better than 
exponential functional forms (e.g., Rachlin, 1989; Green et. al., 1994; Kirby and 
                                                 
2 The discrete functional forms are used here to ease exposition. The continuous 
exponential discount function is exp( ) d ρ − , and the corresponding exponential 
discount rate is simply ρ . 
  5Marakovic, 1995; Kirby et al., 1997; and recently by neuroeconomists, Kable and 








where k is a per-period discount parameter, and d is the number of such periods in the 
delay. Higher values of k imply greater discounting. Because the delay d is in the 
denominator of the hyperbolic discount function, the impact of an additional unit of 
delay, from d to d+1, will be greater when the original delay d is short than when the 
delay is long (see Read, 2003; Ainslie, 1975). The corresponding hyperbolic discount 
rate can be derived using Equation 2 and is: 








Regardless of the functional form, a future reward will be discounted more the greater 
the individual’s SDR. 
  To calculate each person’s SDR such as in Equation 3b or 4b, one needs to 
find that person’s value for ρ or k (depending on the assumed discount function), and 
this can be done by having the person perform a series of delay discounting tasks (i.e. 
make a series of trade-offs between less money in an earlier time period and more 
money later). Suppose an individual has won a reward A to be received at some future 
date t+d. With the future reward as part of his new budget constraint, the individual 
derives utility U from a new string of per period consumption stream as follows: 
(5)  ( ) 1 , ,..., ,... tt t d T UU c c c Ac ++ =+ .  
Suppose this individual is given the choice of receiving an alternate reward V today 
(when d=0) in lieu of receiving A in the future. The amount V that would make him 
indifferent between receiving V today relative to receiving A in time t+d is the 
equivalent present value of A (see Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992 for a more general 
  6exposition),
3 such that  
(6)  () ( ) 1 ,..., ,..., , ,..., ,..., tt d T t t t d Uc V c c Ucc c A c ++ + += + T ,  
which when substituted into Equation 1, results in: 
(7)  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) t t td td uc V uc Fd uc A uc ++ +− = +− . 
This essentially says that the value of the marginal utility derived from receiving an 
award today of amount V is equivalent to the discounted present value of the marginal 
utility derived from receiving a future award of magnitude A with a delay d.  
  Although not an entirely innocuous assumption, most delay discounting tasks 
used to elicit discount parameters in the literature also make a further assumption that 
the utility function u(.) in Equation 7 is related to the quantity of consumption goods 
by a multiplicative constant (see Read, 2003). This linearity assumption essentially 
reduces Equation 7 to: 
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 for a hyperbolic discount function. 
Existing Theories of Delay Discounting 
  We next present the relevant literature on why delay discounting occurs, and 
specifically, why age may be a determinant of delay discounting. Early researchers’ 
attempts at explaining the underlying mechanisms of delay discounting have been 
well summarized by Frederick et. al. (2002). Rae (1834) viewed intertemporal choice 
 
3 There is some evidence in the literature that respondents being asked to perform the 
delay discounting tasks often do not distinguish between earnings and consumption; 
they often treat money as if they would automatically spend it when received (Read 
and Powell 2002). 
  7behavior as a joint product of factors that promoted delay of consumption (such as the 
bequest motive and a social norm of self-restraint) and hastening of consumption 
(such as the uncertainty of human life, the reduction in ability to enjoy pleasure with 
ageing, and the discomfort from delaying gratification). The uncertainty of life carries 
the risk that postponed consumption might not be realized, and this has been further 
modeled by Yaari (1965) and later Halevy (2005) as to why delay discounting may 
change with age. In addition to mortality risks, age is also associated with morbidity 
risks. Börsch-Supan and Stahl (1991) modeled how deteriorations in health of the 
elderly constrained their consumption, and, more recently, Trostel and Taylor (2001) 
using state-dependent utility functions theorized that as people’s ability to enjoy 
consumption declines at an increasing rate over time due to ageing, people should 
increasingly discount the future since the marginal utility of consumption will decline 
with age. Reductions in marginal utility from declines in health have been found 
empirically by Finkelstein et al. (2008). 
  In addition to the models from economics, evolutionary biology approaches 
have also been used to explain how the discount rate should change with age (Rogers, 
1994; Sozou and Seymour, 2003). Because successful reproduction to propagate one’s 
genes requires expending resources and because reproductive potential varies with 
age, these models also link SDR with age. Rogers (1994) identified three determinants 
of delay discounting, namely an expectation of rising consumption, declining 
reproductive value, and bequest possibilities. Rogers predicted an inverted U-shaped 
SDR-age profile for a 5-10 year investment horizon: sexually immature youngsters 
should save resources for use later for reproduction (low SDR), sexually mature 
adults should expend resources pursuing reproduction and not save, since they face 
the threat of mortality with time as well as fertility decline with ageing (high SDR), 
  8and old people with little prospects for propagating their genes by reproduction should 
save resources and transfer them to an offspring with genes like their own (low SDR). 
Sozou and Seymour (2003) used similar reasoning as that of Rogers but also allowed 
for uncertain exogenous environmental hazard and no bequests. (Also, their model did 
not include sexually immature youngsters, in contrast with that of Rogers.) They 
predicted a U-shaped relationship between one’s SDR and one’s age: young sexually 
mature adults, not knowing when they will die, should expend resources to reproduce 
(high SDR), middle-aged adults with reproductive prowess, but with low mortality 
hazard given that those with high mortality hazards have all died, could take a longer-
term view (low SDR), and old adults, with low environmental hazard but rapidly 
declining fertility and rapidly rising ageing-related mortality, should act as if there is 
no tomorrow (high SDR). Sozou and Seymour further suggested that genes for 
‘visceral pleasures’ such as eating, drinking, and partying, proxy for reproduction and 
should face similar time preference functions.
4
  Therefore, theories from both economics and evolutionary biology, although 
they disagree on the form of the relationship and the reasons for it, all share one 
important prediction – age should bear (some kind of) a relationship with the SDR.  
Previous Empirical Studies 
                                                 
4 In addition to the models of delay discounting due to the effects of ageing and its 
associated morbidity and mortality risks, there are also psychology and neuroscience 
explanations for delay discounting. Jevons (1888) and Jevons (1905) postulated that 
people only care about immediate utility and that forward looking behavior results 
only from utility derived from anticipation of future consumption, which is 
counteracted by the pains from gratification delay. This conflict model of delay 
discounting has received support from recent neuroscience studies using either 
monetary (McClure et al., 2004) or gustatory (McClure et al., 2007) reward, although 
the dual system of delay discounting is not without controversy (see Glimcher and 
Kable, 2008). 
  9Empirically, there is some support for a relationship between age and the SDR, but 
the exact shape of the relationship differs by study. Trostel and Taylor (2001) tested 
their model using micro-level longitudinal consumption data in the U.S. to 
empirically support their theory and found a statistically significant negative 
relationship between age and consumption growth (where higher consumption growth 
was assumed to reflect a lower discount rate). The study further tested for a nonlinear 
effect of age on consumption growth and found that the effect of the linear and the 
quadratic terms for age were jointly significant in determining consumption growth, 
but the terms were individually insignificant (see footnote 19 in Trostel and Taylor, 
2001).  
  Instead of measuring SDR indirectly through consumption changes over time, 
a few studies have measured SDR directly by posing questions similar to those as 
depicted in Equation 6. Green et al. (1994) surveyed 36 participants in the U.S. drawn 
from 3 age brackets (sixth graders, college students, and older adults with mean age 
around 68), by presenting them with a hypothetical reward to be received in the future 
(as the variables A in Equation 6) and asking them their equivalent present value (V in 
Equation 6) when the delay (d) ranged from 1 week to 25 years. Using a hyperbolic 
discount function, they found that the older adults had a discount parameter (k in 
Equation 8c) that was much lower than that found for college students, whose 
discount parameter in turn was much smaller than sixth graders – suggesting an 
inverse SDR-age relationship.  
  Using a slightly different experimental procedure, Harrison et al. (2002) 
elicited discount rates among 268 people between the ages of 19 and 75 drawn from a 
nationally representative sample in Denmark. The participants were asked to choose 
between a smaller sooner reward to be received with a one-month front end delay and 
  10a larger later reward to be received in 7, 13, 15, or 37 months. The delay discounting 
task was also incentive compatible, because the participants had a chance to win an 
actual reward as chosen in the delay discounting task. The results showed that the 
average discount rate among those aged 41 to 50 was lower than the discount rate 
among those either younger than 41 or older than 50, indicative of a U-shaped 
relationship between SDR and age (as predicted by Sozou and Seymour, 2003). 
Nevertheless, having controlled for other demographic characteristics, the regression 
results showed no statistically significant differences in discounting between people in 
different age brackets. The regression did show, however, that those who were retired 
(and hence among the oldest in the sample) had significantly greater discount rates 
than those still working.  
  Read and Read (2004) conducted a study designed specifically to test the 
relationship between SDR and age, by surveying 123 U.K. respondents selected using 
a quota sample of three distinct age groups consisting of the young (mean age of 25), 
middle-aged (44), and elderly (75). Using either a larger later hypothetical reward 
(such as A in Equation 6) and asking for the equivalent present value (V) or a smaller 
sooner hypothetical reward (V) and eliciting the equivalent future value (A), the study 
examined discounting over various time horizons (from 1 to 10 years, with front end 
delays that ranged from 0 to 7 years). In addition to hypothetical monetary rewards, 
the study also examined discounting with respect to receiving holiday time or getting 
the flu. To test for a curvilinear relationship between SDR and age, linear and 
quadratic versions of the variable age were included in the analyses. The study mostly 
confirmed the theoretical predictions of Sozou and Seymour (2003) and the empirical 
findings of Harrison et al. (2002), that the middle aged group had the lowest discount 
rate, followed by the young, and with the elderly discounting the most. This U-shaped 
  11relationship between SDR and age was significant for monetary rewards in the 0-10 
and 7-10 year time horizons. After having controlled for other demographic variables, 
the signs of the regression coefficients for age and for age squared reflected a U-
shaped relationship between SDR and age, but the linear term for age in the 0-10 year 
horizon and the quadratic term for age in the 7-10 year horizon became insignificant. 
The paper did not report whether the linear and quadratic terms were jointly 
significant.  
  Age, therefore, has been studied as a determinant of delay discounting, both 
theoretically and empirically. However, age as modeled by both the evolutionary 
biology and the economics approaches was merely a proxy for factors that affected 
propagation of one’s genes and one’s ability to enjoy pleasure, respectively. Two key 
factors implicitly important in determining reproductive fitness and felicity are 
mortality risks (which reduce the time available for reproduction and for fun) and 
morbidity risks (which reduce the ability to reproduce and to consume and enjoy fun 
activities).  
However, the direct effects of mortality and morbidity on delay discounting 
have received relatively little attention in the empirical literature. Existing studies that 
include only age cannot separate out the different effects contributed by morbidity and 
mortality risks from other age-related factors that influence preferences and 
behavioral patterns over the lifespan. The very few studies that did examine the 
impact of mortality and morbidity risks on delay discounting have also found mixed 
results. For instance, Trostel and Taylor (2003) found no effect from mortality risk 
(measured by life table estimates of survival probability based on the demographics of 
the respondents) or morbidity (measured by the health-related absenteeism) on 
consumption growth, although it is unclear whether these mortality and morbidity 
  12measures were insignificant because they indeed had no effect, or whether the 
measures were poor proxies for actual risks. The few studies that have included 
proxies for health have mostly included only dichotomous or linear terms for health, 
which may not be sufficient if health like age could be non-linearly related to the 
discount rate. Kirby et al. (2002) found no relationship between body mass index and 
SDR. Read and Read (2004), using two dichotomous variables for health (good vs. 
bad health; disease in last year vs. not), found poor health to be unrelated to 
discounting for monetary rewards but related to discounting of a vacation reward.
5  
  Our paper makes a contribution to this ongoing debate by examining SDR and 
its associations with not just age, but also with the respondents’ level of morbidity (as 
measured by a health status instrument) and their mortality risks (as measured by their 
subjective survival probability). Our main hypotheses are that morbidity and mortality 
(or health and survival expectations) are systematically related to the SDR. Rather 
than make assumptions and build a theory about the exact shape of this relationship, 
we examine empirically the relationship between age, health, and survival 
expectations, allowing for both linear and non-linear relationships, as well as 
controlling for other variables that may potentially impact delay discounting. In 
contrast to prior studies that have found age to be a factor associated with delay 
discounting, we find that health and survival expectations but not age are significant 
                                                 
5 Various studies examine the relationship between time preference and real-world 
behaviors. For example, Chapman and Coups (1999) and Chapman et. al. (2001) 
examine the relationship between time preferences and preventative health behaviors, 
like getting vaccinated against influenza or taking medication to control hypertension 
and high cholesterol. Bickel et al. (1999)  and Kirby et al. (1999) compare discount 
rates for addicts (cigarettes and heroin, respectively).  See Chapman (2005) for a 
review.  This is distinct from considering the relationship between time discounting 
and health. 
  13factors associated with the SDR. We discuss our method, followed by our results and 
findings, then we speculate on the underlying mechanisms of delay discounting that 
could account for our findings, and we conclude with some potential implications of 
our findings. 
METHOD 
Participants and Procedures  
This study is part of a larger study on the impact of poor health and HIV/AIDS on 
micro and small enterprises (MSEs) around Durban, South Africa. The sample is 
described in detail elsewhere (Chao et al., 2007). Surveys were conducted over a three 
year period in six randomly selected townships stratified by income around Durban, 
with information on health, business activity, and general demographics. Questions on 
delay discounting were asked during the third year of the survey. This paper is based 
on the results from the total of 175 individuals that had completed the delay 
discounting task.  
Measures 
Five parts of the questionnaire were used to measure the respondent’s SDR, physical 
and mental health, subjective probabilities of one-, five-, and ten-year survival, 
planning and savings behavior, and expectations of future economic condition.  
Subjective discount rate. We adopted the time preference instrument originally 
developed by Kirby and Marakovic (1995) and Kirby et al. (1999), by using the South 
African Rand (which had an exchange rate at the time of survey of about 6.7 rand to 
the dollar). This instrument presented the participants with a set of 27 hypothetical 
choices between smaller immediate rewards (V) and larger later rewards (A), as in 
Equation 6. The delay discounting task essentially asked the respondents whether they 
wanted the reward on the right side of Equation 6 or the reward on the left side of 
  14Equation 6, when V, A, and d were varied. The larger later rewards were always 
around one of three sizes: R80, R55, and R30. The delays ranged from 1 week to 6 
months and were presented as number of days from today.
6
An example of one of the choices in this instrument was “Would you prefer 
R54 today or R80 in 30 days?” To prevent the participants from anchoring to one 
fixed larger later reward, the amount A also varied by plus R5 to minus R5 from the 
three separate reference rewards of R80, R55, and R30. The exact numbers of days of 
delay and the possible smaller immediate rewards were also varied. Although the 
combinations of V, d, and A were varied for each of the 27 questions, they were 
designed to give 9 possible discount rates when the respondent became indifferent 
between the left and the right side of Equation 6. From these choices, three separate 
SDRs can be calculated for each of the three larger later reward magnitudes as well as 
an overall SDR. In this paper, we use the SDRs from just the largest of the three 
reward magnitudes (R80); this reduces the additional errors from the ‘magnitude 
effect’ of combining the three reward types into an overall SDR.
7 Because we were 
unable to make a 100% guarantee of delivery of the future reward to our participants 
(due to logistical issues), we did not use real rewards in the delay discounting task.
8  
                                                 
6 We did not include a front-end delay to the immediate reward, which has been used 
in some delay discounting tasks to control for transaction costs related to waiting that 
may confound pure time preference.  
7 The SDRs for the three magnitudes in our data are highly correlated with each other 
(Pearson correlation coefficient > 0.80) and also highly correlated with the overall 
SDR (Pearson correlation coefficient > 0.90). Our main results and conclusions do not 
change if all 27 questions were used to calculate an overall SDR. 
8 It is not obvious from the literature whether having a real payoff during delay 
discounting tasks would result in better measures of SDR. Coller and Williams 
(1999), using a between subject design, found the discount rates from hypothetical 
questions to be smaller than those from questions with real payoffs; however, Johnson 
  15Health Measures. We used the SF12 health status instrument, which consisted of 12 
questions that assessed symptoms, functioning, and quality of life along two 
dimensions: mental and physical health. Examples of questions included in the SF12 
are “Please tell me if your health now limits you in carrying out moderate activities 
that you might do during a typical day, such as walking to transport or helping at 
home? If so, how much?” and “How much of the time during the past 4 weeks did 
you have a lot of energy?” Also, one of the 12 questions was a self-assessed general 
health question in which the respondent was asked to rate his/her health into five 
categories, ranging from excellent to poor. Separate scores for physical health 
(PCS12) and for mental health (MCS12) were obtained by weighting each question 
according to a formula (Ware et al., 1995). This instrument has been validated in 
many developing countries in various languages including Zulu speaking populations 
in South Africa (available from QualityMetric.com) and was designed to be easily 
administered to and answered even by respondents who could not read.  
Subjective Probabilities of Survival. The next set of questions asked individuals to 
rate their subjective probabilities of survival between 0% to 100% to measure how 
certain the respondent was that he/she would not die in the next 1, 5, or 10 years. A 
similar question was asked in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) in the U.S. A 
study by Smith et al. (2001) demonstrated that respondents not only could answer 
these questions, but that their answers indeed predicted their own mortality.  
Planning and Savings Behavior. We asked questions about the respondents’ 
planning behavior and savings behavior. For the planning behavior, we asked whether 
the respondents classified themselves as planning ahead all the time or living from 
                                                                                                                                            
and Bickel (2002) and Madden et al. (2003), using a within subject design, found no 
statistical difference in discount rates derived from real and hypothetical questions. 
 
  16day to day. Similarly, for savings behavior, we asked whether the respondents 
classified themselves as preferring to spend money to enjoy life today or to save more 
for the future. These questions were modeled after the US Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics. We also asked about the time horizon (ranging from a few months, a year, 
to the next several years) in the respondents’ planning and savings behavior. 
Expectations of Economic and Business Situation in the Next Two Years. Because 
current versus future marginal utility of the hypothetical reward depends on the 
baseline income level in the two time periods, we asked all respondents whether they 
expected the economic situation of their community to improve a lot, improve a little, 
remain the same, decline a little, or decline a lot in the next two years.  
Data Analysis 
Because the main papers that studied the relationship between age and SDR used 
different discount functions to calculate the SDR (Green et al., 1994 used a 
hyperbolic function but Read and Read, 2004 and Harrison et al., 2002 used 
exponential discount functions), we used both the hyperbolic and the exponential 
discount functions (as depicted in Equations 3 and 4, respectively) to calculate the 
SDR and in our analyses. Regardless of which functional form was used in our 
analyses, however, the results and conclusions did not differ by discount function. 
  Using the calculated SDR for each participant, we analyzed the bivariate 
relationships between the SDR and the respondents’ demographic characteristics, as 
well as their age, health, and expectations of their own subjective survival probability 
to live a certain number of years. We then performed a series of multivariate 
regressions using both ordinary least squares and two-sided tobit, with both SDR and 
the natural log of the SDR as the dependent variable. The results were similar but not 
identical, and our main conclusions remain the same with the various specifications. 
  17Given that the SDRs elicited by the hypothetical monetary tradeoffs are censored 
between 0.00016 and 0.135, we used two-sided tobit regressions to account for the 
left- and right-side censoring of the calculated SDR. Because the SDR is highly 
skewed without the log transformation, we present below the results obtained from 
two-sided tobit regressions with ln(SDR) as the dependent variable. Given that the 
delay discounting task used the number of days as the delay, all the discount rates are 
measured as discount rate per day.  
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents the mean and median SDRs for the full sample and for the 
subsamples defined by various sociodemographic variables. The first column also 
presents the mean and standard deviation for sociodemographic variables with a 
continuous distribution. The full sample consists of 175 individuals, with 73% female 
and 46% married or cohabiting, and a mean age around 46 years, with a range from 
18 to 91. Over 80% of the sample consists of current or former small business owners. 
The respondents’ mean physical and mental health scores for the SF12 are 47.48 and 
51.90, respectively, with standard deviations of 12.1 and 10.9. The mean health scores 
in our population are similar to those in the United States (which have a normalized 
score of 50 and a standard deviation of 10) (Ware et al., 1995). Twenty-five percent 
of respondents report their health to be fair or poor (instead of excellent, very good, or 
good). In terms of the respondents’ expectations regarding their one-year survival 
probability, 38% (67 out of 175) say they are 100% confident that they will “live to 
this time next year,” and 21% state at least a 60% chance of not living until the next 
year. The mean response is an 82% confidence to live to the next year. When we 
asked individuals their expectations to living to this time in five years (not shown in 
  18Table 1), 25% expressed a 100% confidence that they would live to this time in 5 
years, and 31% of respondents expressed a 50-50 chance of living to the next 5 years. 
A similar pattern is found when we consider individuals’ expectations to live 10 
years. While 19% of respondents were 100% confident that they will be alive, 48% of 
respondents expressed a 50-50 percent chance or lower of being alive in 10 years. 
  The overall mean and median for the SDR (calculated using Equation 3b) for 
the full sample are 0.068 and 0.0256  (per day), respectively, shown in the last row of 
Table 1.
9 Because of the censoring of the SDRs due to the nature of the monetary 
delay discounting tasks used, (with a lower bound of 0.00016 and an upper bound of 
0.135), there is also a significant number of individuals displaying the lowest SDR (7 
in 175) and a large number of respondents displaying the highest SDR (31 in 175). 
//Insert Table 1 about here.// 
Table 1 also presents the mean and median SDRs grouped by sociodemographic 
variables and by health and survival expectations, and the Kruskal-Wallis test for 
significance in difference between groups. It is interesting to note that gender, marital 
status, business ownership, and income level of the respondent’s area of residence 
were not statistically significantly related to SDR. Respondents with no education had 
significantly higher SDR than those with some education.  
  We next examined the bivariate relationship between the SDR and age, 
physical health, mental health, and subjective survival probability. Spearman rank 
                                                 
9 Kirby et al. (1999) and Kirby et al. (2002), using the same delay discounting tasks 
as ours, report k-parameters (as the k in Equation 4a) instead of SDRs. Our sample 
shows a mean k-parameter of 0.078 with a median of 0.046, both measured per day. 
These statistics are substantially higher than the k-parameters for both heroin addicts 
(mean of 0.025) and controls (mean of 0.013) studied by Kirby et al. (1999) in the 
U.S., but lower than the k-parameters (median of 0.12) found by Kirby et al. (2002) 
among the Tsimane’ Amerindians in Bolivia. 
  19correlation was insignificant between SDR and all these other variables (not shown in 
the table). This could either be because a relationship between these variables and the 
SDR does not exist, or that the relationship is non-linear. Because the theoretical 
predictions (see Introduction above) suggest that the relationship between age and 
SDR may be non-linear and perhaps U-shaped, we next divided the sample into 
approximate quintiles.
10 It is interesting to note that older people do seem to have 
higher discount rates than younger people, although this was not statistically 
significant. Physical and mental health as well as survival expectations all bear some 
kind of a U-shaped relationship with SDR, although only survival expectation was 
significant.  
We also examined the relationship between SDRs and several behavioral 
variables that are often linked with time preference, such as willingness to plan for the 
future and to save money, and the results are shown in Table 2. We found that 
respondents who claimed that they had one year or longer planning or savings 
horizons had significantly lower SDRs than those with short horizons. Because 
planning and savings for long horizons require a preference for waiting for a larger 
reward in the future, the results in Table 2 suggest that the level of ‘patience’ as 
measured by our SDR is consistent with the planning and savings behaviors in our 
sample. 
//Insert Table 2 about here // 
  In addition to bivariate relationships, we next explored the relationship that 
SDR has with age, health, and survival expectations, while controlling for other 
                                                 
10 Because of ties in the respondents’ age, health, or survival expectations variables, 
each quintile did not contain exactly one-fifth of the sample size. Survival was 
extremely right skewed, so the last two quintiles included those with 100% one-year 
survival expectations. 
  20potential confounders. Using two-sided tobit regression, we first regressed ln(SDR) 
on age and then also with age squared, but neither variable was significant (shown in 
Columns 1a and 1b of Table 3, respectively). We next included other demographic 
covariates plus area-specific dummy variables, and the results are shown in Column 
1c. It is noteworthy that the SDR did have a U-shaped relationship with respect to 
age, as predicted by Sozou and Seymour (2003) and found empirically by Read and 
Read (2004). However, in our study, this relationship was not statistically significant 
for either age alone or with both age and age squared jointly (test of joint significance, 
F(2, 165) = 0.53, p > 0.59). Gender and marital status were also insignificant, but 
those who had no education had a significantly higher SDR than those with at least 
some primary school education. Some of the area specific dummy variables were also 
significant. 
//Table 3: Two-Sided Tobit Regression of ln(subjective discount rate)// 
  We next examined whether health and survival probability were associated 
with SDRs, and these results are presented in Columns 2a, 2b, and 2c in Table 3. 
Physical health, but not mental health, was highly significantly associated with the 
SDR. Given that health may be associated with the SDR through its effect on 
mortality risk, we next added the one-year subjective probability of survival to the 
regression.
11 Interestingly, as shown in specification 2c of Table 3, survival was not 
only highly significant, but inclusion of the survival variables reduced both the 
magnitude and the significance level of the physical health variables – suggesting that 
part of the effect of the health variable on SDR was via the relationship between 
                                                 
11 Because the questions to elicit the SDRs were all framed with a delay that is less 
than one year, we use the 1-year survival probability in our analyses below; the results 
from using the 5- or 10-year survival probability variable bear similar trends as the 1-
year. 
  21health and survival. In regressions not reported in Table 3, we also included one-year 
survival without the health variables; the coefficient magnitude and significance level 
of the survival variables were not reduced with the inclusion of the health variables. 
This suggests that the effect of survival on discounting is not via health, but part of 
the effect of health on discounting is via survival.  
  From specification (2c) in Table 3, it is apparent that the relationship between 
the SDR and both health and survival was U-shaped. This suggests that those in very 
poor health have high SDRs, but those in very good health also have high SDRs. 
Similarly those with both high and low survival probabilities (but not those in 
between), display high SDRs. In fact, the nadir of the U-relationship between SDR 
and health occurred when PCS12 was 37.8, or less than one standard deviation below 
the mean physical health level of the sample. The nadir for the U-shaped relationship 
between the SDR and the one-year survival probability occurred at around 75%, or 
slightly below the mean subjective survival probability for the sample.  
  Because expanding income in the future may reduce the marginal utility of 
consumption in the future (and hence lead to greater discounting of the future), we 
next included a variable on the respondent’s subjective outlook for the overall 
economic environment in their community in the next two years.
12 (Ten respondents 
did not answer this question and were excluded from subsequent analysis.) This 
variable is only a crude proxy for the respondents’ subjective outlook for their own 
future consumption opportunity, so the results should be interpreted with caution. 
Columns 3a, 3b, and 3c show that those who thought the economy was going to 
worsen a lot in the next two years (the omitted dummy) had the lowest SDR. The U-
                                                 
12 Our survey unfortunately did not ask the respondents about their own future 
consumption opportunity. 
  22shaped effect from health and from survival probability on SDR continues to be 
significant. To control for any effect from business ownership (compared to never 
owning a business) and liquidity constraints (which was crudely proxied for with a 
question that asked the respondent if he/she knew where to go if he/she needed to 
borrow 100 Rand), we included two dummy variables, which were found to be 
insignificant, while health and survival expectations continued to be significantly U-





Several of our findings are new. Our first main finding is that age is not a significant 
predictor of time preference, which is in contrast to the findings in Green et al. (1994) 
and Read and Read (2004). Our findings may differ from those of these authors for at 
least two reasons. One is that only 25% of our sample consists of people over the age 
of 55 and that our sample may not contain enough older people to show an age effect, 
whereas Read and Read (2004) concentrated their sample selection based on three age 
strata, with the oldest strata around age 70. Notably, we are comparing different kinds 
of people in very different environments. The other reason is that health and survival 
probability, not age, may be a true underlying determinant of people’s SDRs. In 
populations where age does correlate well with health and survival probability, the 
effect of these other variables on SDRs can be well-manifested by the effects from 
age. However, because causes of morbidity and mortality in South Africa are not 
necessarily related to age, age is no longer a strong predictor of health and expected 
survival and, hence, of SDRs. 
  23  Our second main finding is the U-shaped relationship between health and the 
SDR. The few studies that did examine the relationship between health and the SDR 
did not find evidence of such a relationship probably because of the crude health 
measure used and because of the lack of a non-linear term in these other studies’ 
regressions. It is worth noting that even in our study, the effect from health on SDR is 
reduced both in magnitude and in significance with the inclusion of survival 
probability. Although we cannot determine what is driving the real relationship 
between health and the discount rate, we speculate here on our findings. 
Respondents in our sample with average health have a lower discount rate than 
those who are very healthy or very sick, and this could be due to several reasons. 
First, according to Trostel and Taylor (2001), Olsho (2006), and Finkelstein et al. 
(2008), the ability to enjoy consumption depends on an individual’s health, and the 
healthier an individual, the greater the marginal utility of consumption. Because 
health generally declines over the life cycle, individuals should have a high SDR 
when healthy and, thus, enjoy consumption while they still can. Second, people who 
have less than excellent health are likely those who have experienced some health 
decline (such as the general decline in health over time), and the future may have 
become more salient for these people (as in Liu and Aaker, 2007, Becker and 
Mulligan, 1997), resulting in a lower SDR for the future. This may seem somewhat 
counterintuitive, in that some would argue that an individual who experiences a loss 
(in health or of a relative) may be more likely to “live for the moment.” Nevertheless, 
in a series of well-controlled experimental setups, Liu and Aaker (2007) showed that 
personal experience with someone who died of cancer is associated with decisions 
that favor long-term future over the short-term present, and this effect seems to be 
related to the “salience and concreteness regarding one’s future life course, shifting 
  24focus away from the present toward the long run.” This has been speculated by 
Böhm-Bawerk (1889) who suggested that people discounted the future because they 
lacked ability to imagine the future, but Becker and Mulligan (1996) later suggested 
that this ability could be improved by investing in inputs to augment future-oriented 
capital, such as spending time with one’s ageing parents to increase the salience of old 
age. Having experienced a loss (in one’s own health or that of a relative) may have 
contributed to the incentive to invest in the future. The foregoing explains why people 
of average health may have lower SDRs than those with very good health. We also 
find a higher SDR among people with very poor health, and this finding is having 
controlled for expected survival probability (and hence ‘wanting to deplete resources 
before death’ cannot completely explain this finding). People with very poor health 
may have more immediate need for cash to pay for medical care or for daily survival 
(perhaps because they are too sick to work), hence the unwillingness to wait for the 
larger reward. Unfortunately, our data set limits us from testing for these speculations, 
which must await future studies. 
  Our third main finding is a U-shaped relationship between the SDR and 
survival probability after controlling for current physical and mental health status. It is 
reasonable for people with low expected survival to have a high SDR, because their 
future consumption may never come. It is somewhat perplexing as to why those with 
a very high expected survival probability also highly discount the future. We believe 
that saliency of time (as in Liu and Aaker, 2007) may explain this finding as well. It is 
plausible that people who expect a very high probability of survival may not have had 
cues from the environment to tell them otherwise; mortality to them is nonexistent. 
However, as they experience deaths from social and family networks, death becomes 
more salient. They not only start to revise downward their expected survival 
  25probability, but they also start to think more about the future. As the future becomes 
more salient, they are more likely to invest in “future oriented capital” and will 
discount the future less (as in Becker and Mulligan, 1997). This speculation also 
needs to be tested in future studies.  
  In spite of our inability to dig deeper as to the many mechanisms by which 
health and survival probability should have U-shaped relationships with SDR, the 
potential importance of health and survival probability as determinants of delay 
discounting is a novel finding. The inclusion of comprehensive measures of health 
status and expected survival probability is an important contribution. The inclusion of 
these variables is already implicit in the theories that we reviewed, but we think it is 
important to include these variables more explicitly in empirical specifications in 
order to tease apart the contributions of each of these variables and to understand the 
true factors that determine the SDR. From the empirical standpoint, the use of the 
SF12 instrument as a comprehensive measures of health status is less subject to 
systematic measurement error than single question health status measures (Dow et al., 
1997) and may be what contributed to our capturing the U-shaped relationship 
between health and the SDR. Furthermore, incorporating subjective survival 
probabilities as a determinant of time preference is important because age proxies for 
a lot of factors in life, with mortality risk being only one such factor. In particular, 
many studies confound the differential effects of age and expected survival 
probability on discounting.  Although age is correlated with health and expected 
survival probability in developed economies, in South African townships where 
morbidity and mortality risks are very high and where disease profiles are not 
necessarily related to ageing, age may not be a good proxy for morbidity and 
mortality. For instance, HIV morbidity and mortality afflict people age 20-40 far more 
  26than those below 20 or above 40 (Shisana et al., 2005). 
LIMITATIONS  
The study is subject to several limitations and the results must be interpreted with 
caution. The first limitation is that we had a small sample that consisted of mostly 
business operators. While this gave us confidence that the answers to questions 
involving monetary tradeoffs were less likely to be subject to the problems of low 
mathematical literacy, it is unclear whether our results from a mostly mathematically-
literate population are generalizable to other populations in the developing world. 
Nevertheless, as shown in Table 1 and in specification 4c of Table 3, business owners 
did not have significantly different SDRs than non-owners.. 
  The second limitation is that we did not have good measures of household 
assets and income; we only have measures of the income strata where the respondents 
resided. Relative to the highest income area, the fixed effects for low and middle 
income areas were consistently negative and some statistically significantly negative, 
which indicates that respondents in the lower income areas have lower SDRs than 
those from the highest income area. This finding is opposite to that found by Green et 
al. (1996), who found that income, not age, was associated with SDR, and that found 
by Read and Read (2004), who also included income strata for their time preference 
study among populations of the United Kingdom and found that high income strata 
were associated with a lower SDR. This seeming contradiction may be because all of 
our respondents are poor, just that some are less poor than others. Even our “high 
income” strata would be considered below the lowest income strata in the study 
population of those other authors.  
STUDY IMPLICATIONS 
  Given the robust relationship that survival probability has with SDR and the 
  27marginally significant relationship between health and SDR, our research has at least 
two implications. First, there may be a role for the inclusion of health and survival 
probability into delay discounting models and empirical specifications. Second, 
research into individual characteristics and their relationship with delay discounting is 
an important area for future research, but importantly, future research should try to 
understand if within person changes in health and expected survival probability lead 
to systematic changes in the discount rate. If SDR changes do occur with changes in 
health and survival, then the provision of health care and preventative programs that 
target those with high levels of morbidity and mortality could potentially lead to more 
incentives to invest more for the future, because as people’s health and survival 
prospects improve, they may discount the future less. For those with very low levels 
of morbidity or morality, further investment in their health would be not only less 
cost-effective from a programmatic viewpoint, but also counterproductive if this 
resulted in lower future-oriented thinking. In this case, public health education to 
increase the salience of the future or the provision of pre-commitment devices (e.g., 
Ashraf et al., 2006) may be more welfare enhancing.  
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  33Table 1: Mean and Median Subjective Discount Rate, by Sociodemographic Variables
Mean Median
N SDR SDR χ
2 df p
Full Sample 175 0.0680 0.0256
Gender
     Male 48 0.0530 0.0098 0.06 1 0.81
     Female 127 0.0730 0.0250
Marital Status
     Married or Cohabiting 80 0.0790 0.0256 0.20 1 0.66
     Single, Divorced, Widowed 95 0.0580 0.0250
Age (mean age = 46.52; s.d.=15.09)
     Lowest Quintile 28 0.0600 0.0375 1.07 4 0.90
     2nd Quintile 34 0.0655 0.0256
     3rd Quintile 37 0.0668 0.0100
     4th Quintile 40 0.0698 0.0250
     Highest Quintile 36 0.0744 0.0250
Business Ownership
     Business Owner or Past Owner 143 0.0690 0.0256 0.10 1 0.75
     Never Owner 32 0.0610 0.0250
Education Completed
None 11 0.1630 0.2500 12.29 5 0.03
Some primary  34 0.0722 0.1750
Primary completed 23 0.0666 0.0640
Some secondary  51 0.0497 0.0098
Secondary completed 37 0.0603 0.0256
Beyond secondary 19 0.0690 0.0256
Income
     High Income 55 0.0700 0.0250 0.11 2 0.95
     Middle Income 66 0.0540 0.0250
     Low Income 54 0.0830 0.0590
Physical Health (mean = 47.48; s.d.=12.06)
     Lowest Quintile 34 0.0800 0.0395 3.73 4 0.44
     2nd Quintile 36 0.0720 0.0098
     3rd Quintile 35 0.0590 0.0100
     4th Quintile 43 0.0580 0.0250
     Highest Quintile 27 0.0740 0.0640
Mental Health (mean = 51.90; s.d.=10.86)
     Lowest Quintile 35 0.0670 0.0640 0.71 4 0.95
     2nd Quintile 34 0.0510 0.0250
     3rd Quintile 35 0.0690 0.0250
     4th Quintile 35 0.0670 0.0256
     Highest Quintile 36 0.0850 0.0250
1-Year Survival Probability (mean = 81.83; s.d.=19.71)
0 - 60% 36 0.1130 0.0640 16.18 3 0.00
70 - 80% 48 0.0475 0.0098
90% 24 0.0284 0.0098
100% 67 0.0719 0.0640
Overall business environment in 2 years
Improve a lot 10 0.0440 0.0256 2.83 4 0.59
Improve a little 52 0.0650 0.0640
The same 59 0.0628 0.0250
Decline a little 33 0.0870 0.0098
Decline a lot 10 0.0386 0.0098
Know where to borrow R100
No 86 0.0670 0.0098 3.19 1 0.07
Yes 89 0.0680 0.0640
Area dummies
Area UA (high income) 30 0.0830 0.0448 7.86 5 0.16
Area NC (high income) 25 0.0550 0.0098
Area K (middle income) 36 0.0576 0.0640
Area UJ (middle income) 30 0.0488 0.0100
Area C (low income) 26 0.1010 0.0640
Area M (low income) 28 0.0659 0.0098
of Difference Between Groups
Kruskal Wallis TestTable 2: Mean Discount Rate, by Selected Self-Reported Behavioral Variables
Mean Median
N SDR SDR χ
2 df p
Planning Behavior
     Plan Ahead All the Time 145 0.060 0.026 1.661 1 0.1975
     Live from Day to Day 30 0.105 0.040
Savings Behavior
     Prefer Saving Money 148 0.061 0.025 3.503 1 0.0613
     Prefer Spending Money 25 0.111 0.064
Planning Horizon
Next Few Months 58 0.095 0.064 6.352 2 0.0418
Next Year 71 0.053 0.025
Next Few Years or Longer 46 0.057 0.017
Saving Horizon
Next Few Months 35 0.121 0.064 10.738 2 0.0047
Next Year 79 0.054 0.026
Next Few Years or Longer 61 0.055 0.010
Kruskal Wallis Test
of Difference Between GroupsTable 3: Double-sided Tobit Regression (with log of subjective discount rate * 100 as dependent variable)
Explanatory Variables 1a 1b 1c 2a 2b 2c 3a 3b 3c 4a 4b 4c
Age -0.001 -0.033 -0.058 -0.038 -0.017 0.018 -0.019 0.001 0.040 -0.028 -0.008 0.033
[0.011] [0.058] [0.058] [0.057] [0.058] [0.058] [0.054] [0.057] [0.058] [0.054] [0.056] [0.057]
Age squared 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Gender (female = 1) 0.356 0.399 0.378 0.393 0.192 0.157 0.145 0.206 0.178 0.158
[0.375] [0.367] [0.367] [0.359] [0.355] [0.355] [0.349] [0.351] [0.351] [0.345]
Marital status (married or cohabiting = 1) -0.069 -0.140 -0.167 -0.244 0.026 -0.002 -0.056 0.036 -0.007 -0.037
[0.362] [0.354] [0.354] [0.347] [0.340] [0.341] [0.336] [0.345] [0.346] [0.340]
Area C (low inome) -0.423 -0.422 -0.342 -0.314 -0.357 -0.256 -0.261 -0.451 -0.342 -0.414
[0.592] [0.577] [0.577] [0.581] [0.562] [0.568] [0.570] [0.558] [0.565] [0.570]
Area K (middle income) -0.439 -0.456 -0.460 -0.652 -0.156 -0.181 -0.365 -0.251 -0.263 -0.448
[0.531] [0.518] [0.520] [0.510] [0.496] [0.498] [0.493] [0.493] [0.495] [0.490]
Area M (low income) -1.234 -1.059 -0.945 -1.060 -1.437 -1.357 -1.432 -1.495 -1.412 -1.513
[0.562]* [0.549]+ [0.552]+ [0.543]+ [0.544]** [0.548]* [0.539]** [0.539]** [0.543]* [0.535]**
Area N (high income) -1.164 -1.268 -1.175 -1.212 -1.049 -0.979 -1.032 -0.963 -0.895 -0.965
[0.580]* [0.567]* [0.568]* [0.557]* [0.543]+ [0.545]+ [0.536]+ [0.538]+ [0.540]+ [0.531]+
Area UJ (middle income) -1.248 -1.290 -1.216 -1.393 -1.178 -1.116 -1.289 -1.135 -1.069 -1.241
[0.573]* [0.557]* [0.558]* [0.547]* [0.519]* [0.521]* [0.515]* [0.514]* [0.517]* [0.512]*
Education (no education = 1) 2.571 2.402 2.400 2.545 3.254 3.141 3.195 3.357 3.270 3.307
[0.755]** [0.754]** [0.778]** [0.771]** [0.784]** [0.794]** [0.787]** [0.779]** [0.790]** [0.784]**
Physical health (PCS12) -0.299 -0.310 -0.222 -0.225 -0.233 -0.180 -0.222 -0.228 -0.175
[0.099]** [0.100]** [0.102]* [0.098]* [0.099]* [0.099]+ [0.097]* [0.098]* [0.098]+
Physical health squared 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002
[0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]* [0.001]* [0.001]** [0.001]* [0.001]* [0.001]* [0.001]*
Mental health (MCS12) -0.016 -0.003 -0.050 -0.064 -0.036 -0.061
[0.111] [0.110] [0.112] [0.114] [0.111] [0.112]
Mental health squared 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
One-year survival probability -0.179 -0.151 -0.143
[0.060]** [0.059]* [0.059]*
One-year survival probability squared 0.001 0.001 0.001
[0.000]** [0.000]* [0.000]*
Economic Outlook in 2 Years (reference = Deline a lot)
  Will improve a lot 0.841 0.856 0.858 0.728 0.745 0.810
[0.896] [0.894] [0.892] [0.886] [0.884] [0.882]
  Will imporve a little 1.477 1.521 1.593 1.569 1.605 1.737
[0.699]* [0.697]* [0.694]* [0.690]* [0.688]* [0.689]*
  The same 1.306 1.259 1.254 1.344 1.303 1.323
[0.694]+ [0.692]+ [0.680]+ [0.685]+ [0.683]+ [0.673]+
  Decline a little 1.210 1.203 1.155 1.394 1.376 1.355
[0.718]+ [0.716]+ [0.702] [0.716]+ [0.713]+ [0.702]+
Business ownership (never had a business = 1) -0.350 -0.254 -0.324
[0.420] [0.429] [0.422]
Borrowing constraints (knows where to borrow R100 = 1) 0.477 0.507 0.521
[0.324] [0.327] [0.333]
Constant 1.008 1.721 2.650 6.797 6.090 9.342 3.645 3.879 7.648 3.627 3.475 7.485
[0.550]+ [1.362] [1.334]* [2.285]** [3.479]+ [3.633]* [2.397] [3.469] [3.723]* [2.394] [3.490] [3.739]*
Number of Observations 175 175 175 175 175 175 164 164 164 164 164 164
Likelihood Ratio Chi-square 0.000 0.330 22.440 33.280 35.780 44.990 45.280 46.760 53.900 48.410 49.770 57.280
Pr > Chi-square 0.9512 0.8474 0.013 0.0009 0.0011 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001
Pseudo R-square 0 0.0005 0.0321 0.0476 0.0512 0.0643 0.0693 0.0716 0.0825 0.0741 0.0762 0.0877
[Standard errors in brackets]; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%